Section 6.4

Indian Logic: Means of Knowledge

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Indian Logic, primarily codified by the Nyaya school of philosophy (founded by Sage Gautama), focuses on Epistemology (the theory of knowledge). In Sanskrit, valid knowledge is termed Prama, the object of knowledge is Prameya, the knower is Pramata, and the means of acquiring valid knowledge is Pramana (Radhakrishnan, 1923).

Different orthodox (Astika) and heterodox (Nastika) schools of Indian philosophy accept different numbers of Pramanas. The Vedanta school accepts six, which are comprehensively tested in the UGC NET.

The Six Pramanas

1. Pratyaksha (Perception)

This is the most direct and fundamental means of knowledge. It refers to knowledge acquired through the contact of the senses (Indriyas) with the object (Artha). It is divided into:

  • Laukika (Ordinary): Direct perception via the five physical senses (sight, sound, smell, taste, touch) and the internal sense (mind/Manas).
  • Alaukika (Extraordinary): Perception beyond ordinary senses, such as mystical intuition (Yogipratyaksha).

2. Anumana (Inference)

Knowledge that follows after perception. It is the logical deduction of a hidden truth based on a perceived sign. (This is so critical it is granted its own section in 6.5). An example is inferring the presence of fire on a distant hill because you see smoke.

3. Upamana (Comparison/Analogy)

Knowledge acquired by perceiving similarity. It is learning the relationship between a name (word) and the object it denotes based on a given description.

Example: A city dweller who has never seen a wild cow (Gavaya) is told by a forester that it looks like a regular cow but lacks a dewlap. When the city dweller goes to the forest and sees such an animal, they use Upamana to know "This is a Gavaya."

4. Shabda (Verbal Testimony)

Knowledge derived from the statement of a reliable and trustworthy person (Aptavakya) or infallible scriptures (like the Vedas). Since we cannot personally perceive everything in the universe, we rely heavily on Shabda for scientific and historical facts.

5. Arthapatti (Implication/Postulation)

The postulation of a fact to explain two seemingly contradictory but established facts. It is resolving an apparent conflict.

Classic Example (Devadatta): "Devadatta is getting fat. Devadatta does not eat during the day." The only way to resolve this contradiction is through the Arthapatti that Devadatta must be eating at night.

6. Anupalabddhi (Non-apprehension)

Knowledge of the absence or non-existence (Abhava) of something. If an object should be visible under current conditions, and it is not, its absence is a valid form of knowledge.

Example: "There is no jar on the table." You know this not by perceiving the jar, but by the non-perception of the jar where it normally could be perceived.

Academic References

  • Radhakrishnan, S. (1923). Indian philosophy (Vol. 2). George Allen & Unwin.
  • Vidyabhusana, S. C. (1920). A history of Indian logic: Ancient, mediaeval and modern schools. Calcutta University.